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Abstract
We formulate a new theory of expected utility in which risk and
uncertainty is modelled by the usage of a so called event space which
is a natural generalisation of a state space. The basic idea is that
the decision maker for each group of related decisions creates a ”small
world” (a local state space) from the events in the ”grand world” (the
event space). We introduce a set of preference axioms similar in spirit
to the Savage axioms, and show that they lead to a a more general
expected utility theory, where in each ”small world” risk is described
by an additive probability measure. All local risk measures appear
as restrictions of a common integrated additive expectation functional
defined on the ”grand world”. A benefit of the theory is that it allows
for an intuitive distinction between risk and uncertainty. In particular,
there is a numerical measure of the degree of uncertainty aversion
associated with a given preference relation, which can be calculated.
We illustrate the use of the theory for the Ellsberg paradox and for
a no-trade portfolio decision problem, none of which can be captured
using standard expected utility theory.
JEL classification: D8 and G12.
Key words: Expected utility, decision making under uncertainty, un-
certainty aversion.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a new theory of expected utility, which in a natural
way may be considered as a generalisation of the standard expected utility
theory, but is able to capture the difference between risk and uncertainty.
The differentiation between risk and uncertainty is based on the idea that
the decision maker for each group of similar or related decisions creates a
”small world” consisting of only those events which are considered relevant
in the given context. This may be interpreted as a cognitive process, where,
before a decision is taken, it is grouped together with other decisions in a
small and more manageable world.
The theory is based on two elements. One is the ”global” event space
which is introduced as a natural generalisation of a state space. The other
is a set of axioms on preferences adapted to the more general theory of an
event space. It is perhaps worth noting that our formulation preserves for
”small worlds” the type of axioms introduced by Savage.
The notion of small worlds and their use in modelling decision making is
described in Savage (1954)1:
In the sense under discussion a smaller world is derived from a
larger by neglecting some distinctions between states, not by ig-
noring some states outright. The latter sort of contraction may be
useful in case certain states are regarded by the person as virtually
impossible so that they can be ignored. (page 9)
However, Savage was also keenly aware that the theory he proposed could
be seen as more appropriate when decision making takes place in a small
world:
Any claim to realism made by this book - or indeed by almost
any theory of personal decision of which I know - is predicated
on the idea that some of the individual decision situations into
which actual people tend to subdivide the simple grand decision
do recapitulate in microcosm the mechanism of the idealized grand
decision. (page 83)
The ability to create ”small worlds” from a set representing all possible
”events in the world” is an integral part of Savage’s decision theory, but he
only considers ”small worlds” which are created by partitioning a state space
without considering alternative descriptions. Thus, despite his hesitations
and the extensive discussion of the notion of ”small worlds” and the link
1The page numbers refer to the 1972 edition of the book.
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between these and the ”grand world” Savage uses a framework in which there
is no flexibility in the way ”small worlds” are integrated into the ”grand world”.
In this paper we provide a way forward, which, in our view is a natural
generalisation of Savage’s work and contains Savage’s results, as formulated
in Anscombe and Aumann (1963), as a special case. It is obtained by using
an event space which, contrary to a state space description, allows for a more
sophisticated integration of different ”small worlds” into the ”grand world”.
One advantage of the more general formulation is that it allows us to
introduce a numerical measure between 0 and 1 of the degree of uncertainty
aversion, where 0 corresponds to no uncertainty aversion and 1 to complete
uncertainty aversion. In this sense, we are able to capture ambiguity or
uncertainty by considering more carefully the grouping of events.
Following the terminology in Knight (1921) our approach thus allows us
to distinguish between ”risk” and ”uncertainty”. More precisely, uncertainty
is related to the agent’s perception, derived from his preferences, of events
belonging to different ”small worlds”. Events belonging to a single ”small
world” are only risky. In fact, the standard axioms and the use of ordinary
probability measures are maintained in each ”small world”.
In our view it is not only necessary but also desirable to replace the
state space with a more general event space. Although an analysis based on
counting naturally leads to a probabilistic description on a state space, the
state space is an artifact of the counting process itself and counting may not
be appropriate when agents are confronted with possibly irreversible choices
about the uncertain future. This is particular so when agents are subject to
events which they do not consider to be alternatives. Therefore, our use of
a general event space amounts to a rejection of the idea that a probabilistic
description is suitable for analysis of decision making.
In conclusion, to allow for the possibility that some events cannot be
grouped together in the same ”small world” we introduce the notion of an
event space. We assume that the decision maker, depending on the context,
prepares for a decision by creating a local state space, or ”small world” in
Savage’s terminology, by grouping together suitable events taken from the
”grand world”. Local state spaces are thus created containing only events
which by the decision maker are considered relevant (and true alternatives)
for each decision to be made.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section the general event
space is introduced and discussed. In section 3 the main results are presented
including the measure of uncertainty aversion. Section 4 contains two exam-
ples illustrating the use of the theory. One is the Ellsberg paradox, the other
a portfolio decision problem under uncertainty. The last section discusses
related literature.
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2 The general event space
In this section we introduce a general event space which may be considered as
a generalization of the notion of a sigma algebra on a state space. We choose
projections to represent events simply because projections are equipped with
exactly the properties which we naturally associate with the hierarchy and
logical rules for the interplay of events. This should come as no surprise since,
as we shall demonstrate, also a sigma algebra of events on a state space may
be represented in this way. An event space is therefore an effectively more
general way to represent an event structure than is the usual description by
a sigma algebra on a state space. We demonstrate in a rigorous way how the
notion of an event space is a natural generalisation of a state space. But first
we introduce the ”global” event space2 and discuss the defining properties.
Definition 1 (Event space) An event space is a pair (F , H) consisting of
a separable Hilbert space H and a family F of (self-adjoint) projections on
H satisfying:
(i) The zero projection on H (denoted 0) and the identity projection on H
(denoted 1) are both in F .
(ii) 1− P ∈ F for arbitrary P ∈ F .
(iii) The minorant projection P ∧Q ∈ F for arbitrary P,Q ∈ F .
(iv)
∑
i∈I Pi ∈ F for any family (Pi)i∈I of mutually orthogonal projections
in F .
We begin by listing some comments directly pertinent to the definition of
an event space.
• The family F inherits the natural (partial) order relation P ≤ Q for
projections on a Hilbert space. Notice that 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 for arbitrary
events P ∈ F .
• We define a bijective mapping P → P⊥ of F onto itself by setting
P⊥ = 1− P. The event P⊥ is called the event complementary to P.
• The minorant projection P ∧Q is the projection on the intersection of
the ranges of P and Q. It has the property that R ≤ P ∧ Q for any
event R ∈ F such that both R ≤ P and R ≤ Q.
2The general event space to be used in the remainder of the paper is based on Hansen
(2003).
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The majorant projection P ∨Q is the projection on the closure of the
sum of the ranges of P and Q. It has the property that P ∨Q ≤ R for
any event R ∈ F with P ≤ R and Q ≤ R. Since
P ∨Q = 1− (1− P ) ∧ (1−Q)
it follows that F is closed also under majorant formation.
• Condition (iv) in the definition is a technical requirement3 that ensures
that F is closed under arbitrary formation of minorants or majorants.
Thus to any family (Pi)i∈I of events in F there is a minorant event
∧i∈I Pi and a majorant event ∨i∈I Pi both contained in F .
An event space has a number of properties which are natural for the
representation of events.
• An event space contains the projections 0 and 1 corresponding respec-
tively to the vacuous (empty) event and the universal (sure) event.
• There is a partial order relation ≤ defined in F such that any event
P ∈ F is placed between the vacuous and the universal events, that is
0 ≤ P ≤ 1. More generally, for two events P and Q in F we consider
Q to be a larger, more comprehensive event than P if P ≤ Q.4 The
interpretation is that we know for sure that the eventQ occurs (obtains)
if P occurs.
• The joining of two events P and Q in F is represented by P ∧ Q and
the union is represented by P ∨Q, and these are both included in the
event space F .5 It follows from (iv) that F is even closed under the
joining or union of arbitrary families of events.
The bijective mapping P → P⊥ = 1− P of F which associates an event
with its complimentary event has the following natural properties:
• More comprehensive events have smaller complementary events, ie P ≤
Q ⇒ Q⊥ ≤ P⊥ for all P,Q ∈ F .
• The joining between an event and its complementary event is the empty
event, ie. P ∧ P⊥ = 0 for all P ∈ F .
3The condition corresponds to the requirement that a sigma algebra is complete.
4It corresponds to the statement A ⊆ B for measurable subsets A and B of a state
space.
5We express this by saying that F is a lattice.
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• The union between an event and its complementary event is the sure
event, ie. P ∨ P⊥ = 1 for all P ∈ F .
• The complementary event to the complementary event to an event is
the event itself, ie. P⊥⊥ = P for all P ∈ F .
Suppose that the complementary event to a given event Q is more com-
prehensive than another event P, meaning that if P obtains then so does
the complement to Q. If the events are represented by projections (here also
denoted P and Q) on a Hilbert space H, then the condition is equivalent to
the requirement P ≤ 1−Q = Q⊥ which means that the ranges of P and Q
are orthogonal subspaces of H. For this reason it becomes natural to denote
such events as orthogonal events.
Definition 2 We say that events P and Q in F are mutually exclusive if the
minorant P ∧Q = 0, and we say that P and Q are orthogonal6 if P ≤ Q⊥.
It follows readily from this definition that orthogonal events are mutually
exclusive. However, it may happen that mutually exclusive events are not
orthogonal. In fact, an event space not requiring mutually exclusive events
to be orthogonal is the natural generalisation of a state space. Firstly, one
can demonstrate (Hansen (2003)) that under very mild conditions every state
space has an associated event space. Secondly, it can be shown that an event
space is associated with a state space, if and only if each pair of mutually
exclusive events are orthogonal. This associated state space then satisfies the
same mild conditions as in the first result.
Proposition 1 (Event space associated with a state space)
Suppose that (Ω,S, µ) is a probability space such that Ω is a locally compact,
second countable Hausdorff space, and µ is the completion of the Riesz repre-
sentation of a Radon measure. Then the set F of projections in L∞(Ω,S, µ)
acting as multiplication operators on the Hilbert space H = L2(Ω,S, µ) is
an event space (F , H) with the special property that each pair of mutually
exclusive events are orthogonal.
Note that a typical projection in L∞(Ω,S, µ) is the indicator function of
a measurable set in S. The proof of the proposition is straightforward and is
left as an exercise to the reader7.
At present the authors are not aware of any economic applications using
a state space formulation which do not satisfy the conditions in the above
6Notice that the definition is symmetric in P and Q, ie. P ≤ Q⊥ if and only if Q ≤ P⊥.
7The only complication is condition (iv) in Definition 1 which is proved by appealing
to Lebesque’s theorem of dominated convergence.
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proposition. We have thus demonstrated that any state space, under the
very mild conditions of the proposition, possesses an associated event space.
The following result is found in Hansen (2003).
Theorem 1 Let (F , H) be an event space, cf. Definition 1, satisfying the
following additional condition:
(#) Each pair of mutually exclusive events in F are orthogonal.
Then the event space (F , H) is associated, as specified in the proposition,
with a uniquely defined state space (Ω,S, µ) .
One can easily check if a given event space is associated with a state space
or not. This can be done by relying on the insight that the projections in
an event space satisfying (#) necessarily commute, ie. if an event space only
contains commuting projections then it can associated with a state space.
One the other hand, if an event space contains non-commuting projections
then it cannot be associated with a state space.8
3 Small worlds and expected utility
In this section we first introduce the notions of ”small worlds”, acts and pref-
erences. Then we introduce the set of axioms which we require preferences to
satisfy. After introducing these ”building blocks” we state and prove the main
result in the paper. In the last part of the section we introduce a measure of
uncertainty aversion.
To avoid technical difficulties, we assume in the remainder of the paper
that the Hilbert space H is of finite dimension. This corresponds to a finite
state space in the standard model.
3.1 Small worlds
Given an event space we introduce the notion of a ”small world” or prepa-
ration as a subdivision of the sure event into those constituent parts (risky
events) which are pertinent for a particular set of acts. The notion of a
”small world” or preparation thus fits neatly into Savage’s concept of ”ne-
glecting some distinctions between states”.
Definition 3 A preparation or ”small world” in (F , H) is a set {P1, . . . , Pn}
of projections in F with sum P1 + · · · + Pn = 1 (note that such projections
8Two projections P and Q commute if PQ = QP . Note that the multiplicative structure
plays no direct role in the theory.
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automatically are mutually orthogonal). The set of preparations of (F , H) is
denoted by P (H).
The events in a ”small world” are thus mutually exclusive and their ma-
jorant event is the sure event. Therefore exactly one of the events obtains.
This is why a preparation acts like a local state space. The events function
as (local) states and the obtaining event as the ”true state of nature”. The set
of preparations or ”small worlds” P (H) thus becomes a set of state spaces,
each describing a certain part of the ”grand world” as specified by the event
space (F , H).
3.2 Acts and consequences
Definition 4 An act is a pair (α, f) consisting of a preparation α ∈ P (H)
and a mapping f : α→ C, where C is the set of consequences.
The set of consequences C is assumed to have an affine structure. This
implies that we may define the convex combination (α, h) of acts (α, f) and
(α, g) with the same preparation α ∈ P (H) by setting
h(P ) = tf(P ) + (1− t)g(P ) t ∈ [0, 1]
for each event P ∈ α.
To a given event space (F , H) and set of consequences C, we consider a
set L of actions. For each preparation α ∈ P (H) we assume that the subset
Lα ⊆ L, consisting of the acts in L with preparation α, is convex and includes
the set of constant acts.
3.3 Preferences
Preferences are specified by a binary preference relation º over the set L.
For any consequence c ∈ C and preparation α ∈ P (H) consider the
constant action (α, c) ∈ Lα defined by setting c(P ) = c for every P ∈ α. Note
that for each preparation α ∈ P (H), the preference relation on L induces a
preference relation ºα on C by setting
c ºα d if (α, c) º (α, d)
for consequences c and d in C.
We are now ready to introduce the set of axioms which we will require
the preference relation º over L to satisfy.
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(i) Totality: For all (α, f) and (β, g) in L we have either (α, f) º (β, g)
or (β, g) º (α, f).
(ii) Transitivity: If (α, f) º (β, g) and (β, g) º (γ, h) for actions (α, f),
(β, g) and (γ, h) in L, then (α, f) º (γ, h).
A total and transitive order relation is also called a weak ordering. If
(L,º) satisfies the axioms (i) and (ii), then it follows that the induced order
relation ºα on C, for each preparation α ∈ P (H), enjoys the same properties.
(iii) Independence: Let (α, f), (α, g) and (α, h) be acts in Lα for a prepa-
ration α ∈ P (H). Then
(α, f) Â (α, g) implies (α, tf + (1− t)h) Â (α, tg + (1− t)h)
for each t ∈ (0, 1].
(iv) Continuity: Let (α, f), (α, g) and (α, h) be acts in Lα for a preparation
α ∈ P (H). If (α, f) Â (α, g) and (α, g) Â (α, h), then
(α, tf + (1− t)h) Â (α, g) and (α, g) Â (α, sf + (1− s)h)
for some numbers t, s ∈ (0, 1).
(v) Monotonicity: Let (α, f) and (α, g) be acts in Lα for a preparation
α ∈ P (H). If f(P ) ºα g(P ) for each event P ∈ α, then (α, f) º (α, g).
(vi) Non-degeneracy: To each preparation α ∈ P (H) there exist acts
(α, f) and (α, g) in Lα such that (α, f) Â (α, g).
Note that the axioms (iii) through (vi) apply to each small world at a
time. As each small world can be viewed as a context dependent state space,
and the said axioms coincide with the axioms considered in the version of
Savage’s theory as presented in Anscombe and Aumann (1963), we immedi-
ately obtain the following result:
Theorem 2 (Anscombe-Aumann) Assume that the preference relation º
satisfies the axioms (i) through (vi). Then there exists for each preparation
α ∈ P (H) a map uα : C → R, unique up to an affine transformation, such
that
c Âα d if and only if uα(c) > uα(d)
for consequences c, d ∈ C. Furthermore, there exists a unique subjective prob-
ability distribution Eα over α such that
(α, f) Â (α, g) if and only if Uα(f) > Uα(g)
8
for arbitrary acts (α, f) and (α, g) in Lα, where the expected utility function
Uα is defined by setting
Uα(α, f) =
n∑
i=1
Eα(Pi)uα(f(Pi))
for any act (α, f) ∈ Lα with preparation α = {P1 , . . . , Pn} ∈ P (H), where n
is some natural number depending on α.
For a proof see Anscombe and Aumann (1963), Mas-Colell and Whinston
(1995, Chapter 6) or the discussion in Schmeidler (1989, page 578). The proof
is facilitated by the fact that each local state space or preparation α ∈ P (H),
in the present version of the theory, is a finite set.
Corollary 1 Any act (α, f) in L with preparation α ∈ P (H) is under the
conditions of Theorem 2 equivalent to a constant act (α, c).
Proof: Set c = Eα(P1)f(P1)+ · · ·+Eα(Pn)f(Pn) ∈ C where the preparation
α = {P1, . . . , Pn}, and let (α, c) be the act with constant consequence c.
Since (α, c) ∈ Lα and uα is unique up to an affine transformation we obtain
Uα(α, c) = uα(c) = Uα(α, f). QED
Having introduced the ”small world” axioms we now introduce the ”grand
world” axioms. They are essentially the only new axioms that we introduce.
(vii) Indifference: To each consequence c ∈ C and to any preparations
α, β ∈ P (H) the constant acts (α, c) and (β, c) are equivalent.
The axiom states that constant acts with the same consequence are equiv-
alent across all ”small worlds”. This can be interpreted as the requirement
that a sure bet should be equally attractive, independent of the context in
which it is available. With the indifference axiom in place (which we hence-
forth will assume), it is clear that the induced order relations ºα on C are
equivalent for all preparations α ∈ P (H). We may therefore suppress the
subscript in ºα and just write
c º d if (α, c) º (β, d)
for consequences c and d in C, and preparations α, β ∈ P (H).
Lemma 1 Assume that the preference relation º satisfies the axioms (i)
through (vii). Then there exists a common utility function u : C → R, unique
up to an affine transformation, such that
c Â d if and only if u(c) > u(d)
for consequences c, d ∈ C.
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Proof: The statement follows since all the preference relations ºα, for α ∈
P (H), are equivalent. QED
(viii) Separation: Let α, β ∈ P (H) be preparations with a common event
P ∈ α ∩ β. There exist equivalent actions (α, f) and (β, g) in L and
non-equivalent consequences a, b ∈ C such that
f(P ) ∼ g(P ) ∼ a and f(Q) ∼ g(R) ∼ b
for every Q ∈ α\{P} and R ∈ β\{P}.
The axiom is interpreted as the requirement that if two small ”worlds”
share a common event, it must be possible to make equivalent and non-trivial
bets contingent on the event in both worlds.
Lemma 2 Assume that the preference relation º satisfies the axioms (i)
through (viii). If two preparations α, β ∈ P (H) have a common event P ∈
α ∩ β, then Eα(P ) = Eβ(P ).
Proof: Consider two preparations α, β ∈ P (H) with a common event P ∈
α∩β. By the separation axiom there exist equivalent actions (α, f) and (β, g)
in L and non-equivalent consequences a, b ∈ C such that
f(P ) ∼ g(P ) ∼ a and f(Q) ∼ g(R) ∼ b
for every Q ∈ α\{P} and R ∈ β\{P}. Since a and b are non-equivalent we
may assume u(a) < u(b). We set
d = Eα(P )a+ (1− Eα(P ))b ∈ C
and calculate the α-utility
Eα(α, d) = u(d) = Eα(P )u(a) + (1− Eα(P ))u(b) = Eα(α, f)
of the constant action (α, d), and observe that (α, f) is equivalent to (α, d).
Since the constant actions (α, d) and (β, d) are equivalent by the indifference
axiom, we conclude that (β, g) and (β, d) are equivalent. Therefore,
u(d) = Eβ(β, d) = Eβ(β, g) = Eβ(P )u(a) + (1− Eβ(P ))u(b).
We have thus written u(d) as two convex combinations of u(a) and u(b).
Since u(a) < u(b) we conclude that Eα(P ) = Eβ(P ). QED
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3.4 The main result
Lemma 2 ensures that we unambiguously can define a function
E : F → [0, 1]
by setting E(P ) = Eα(P ) for any preparation α ∈ P (H) containing P. This
function has the property
E(P1) + · · ·+ E(Pn) = 1
for any sequence P1, . . . , Pn of projections in F with sum P1+ · · ·+Pn = 1. A
function with this property is called a frame function, and such functions were
studied by Mackey (1957), Gleason (1957), Varadarajan (1968), Piron (1976)
and others. The following remarkable result was conjectured by Mackey and
proved by Gleason.
Gleasons’ theorem Let F be the (lattice of self-adjoint) projections on a
(real or complex) separable Hilbert space H of dimension greater than or equal
to three, and let F : F → [0, 1] be a frame9 function. Then there exists a
positive semi-definite trace class operator h on H with unit trace such that
F (P ) = Tr (hP )
for any P ∈ F .
Given this, we can now prove our main result:
Theorem 3 Let (F , H) be the event-lattice consisting of all (self-adjoint)
projections on a (real or complex) Hilbert space of finite dimension greater
than or equal to three, let C be a set of consequences equipped with an affine
structure, and let L be a set of actions. For each preparation α ∈ P (H) we
assume that the subset Lα ⊆ L, consisting of the acts in L with preparation
α, is convex and includes the set of constant acts. The primitive datum of
the utility theory is a binary preference relation º over the set L satisfying
the axioms (i) through (ix). There exists then a map u : C → R, unique up to
an affine transformation, and a positive semi-definite operator h on H with
unit trace such that
(α, f) Â (β, g) if and only if U(α, f) > U(β, g)
9Note that such a frame function automatically is continuous by Gleason’s theorem.
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for arbitrary acts (α, f) and (β, g) in L, where the expected utility function
U is defined by setting
U(α, f) =
n∑
i=1
Tr (hPi)u(f(Pi))
for any act (α, f) ∈ L with preparation α = {P1 , . . . , Pn} ∈ P (H), where n
is some natural number depending on α.
Proof: The two acts (α, f) and (β, g) in L are by Corollary 1 equivalent
to constant acts (α, c) and (β, d) respectively, and since Uγ = U for any
preparation γ ∈ P (H) we obtain
U(α, f) = U(α, c) = u(c) and U(β, g) = U(β, d) = u(d).
But since constant acts are ordered by u the statement follows. QED
Note that the statement in the main result implies that the indifference
axiom and the separation axiom for preferences across ”small worlds” also
are necessary conditions. The implication is that these two axioms must be
satisfied in any expected utility formulation of the given form.
3.5 Uncertainty aversion
We are now ready to introduce a measure of uncertainty aversion. With this
purpose in mind, consider two events P and Q in an event space (F , H) and
a decision maker with preferences as given in Theorem 3. Let us to keep
matters simple assume that the events are mutually exclusive, ie. P ∧Q = 0.
If the number
ν(P,Q) = E(P ∨Q)− (E(P ) + E(Q))
is positive, this is interpreted as reflecting the decision maker’s uncertainty
aversion. We may think of an experiment in which a ball is drawn from
an urne with an unknown distribution of red and black balls. The event P
represents the drawing of a red ball while the event Q represents the drawing
of a black ball. The union (majorant) of the two events P ∨ Q is the sure
event so E(P ∨ Q) = 1. The decision maker assigns so low probabilities to
the individual events that their sum is less than the probability of the union.
Therefore the decision maker is uncertainty averse.
Let now P1, . . . , PN be events in F with no further assumptions and
consider the number
ν(P1, . . . , PN) = E(P1 ∨ · · · ∨ PN)−
N∑
i=1
E(Pi).
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This number is obviously less or equal to one and it may be negative, for
example if the events are identical and N ≥ 2. But note that if the events
form (or are just part of) a preparation, then P1 ∨ · · · ∨ PN = P1 + · · ·+ PN
and ν(P1, . . . , PN) = 0.
Definition 5 The number
ν = sup{ν(P1, . . . , Pn) | P1, . . . , Pn ∈ F , N = 1, 2, . . . }.
is defined as the decision maker’s uncertainty aversion.
Thus, a decision maker’s degree of uncertainty aversion is determined as
the largest possible difference between the weight attached to the union and
the sum of the weights of the individual events. Note that by focusing on the
”worst possible” situation the introduced measure of uncertainty aversion is
linked to that of Schmeidler (1989). It is clear from the preceding remarks
that the decision maker’s uncertainty aversion ν is a real number in the
interval [0, 1].
Proposition 2 Let h be the positive semi-definite operator (matrix) on H
with unit trace such that E(P ) = Tr (hP ) for any event P ∈ F . Then
ν = 1− λmin · dimH,
where dimH is the finite dimension of the Hilbert space H and λmin is the
minimal eigenvalue of the operator h.
Proof: Consider the expression ν(P1, . . . , PN) for some events P1, . . . , PN .
Since E is additive we may without loss of generality assume the majo-
rant event P1 ∨ · · · ∨ PN = 1 and that all the constituent projections are
one-dimensional. We may then discart events until all remaining events are
needed to maintain the sure event as majorant. In this situation N = dimH
and the remaining events are necessarily (self-adjoint) projections on a set of
basis vectors in H. The supremum is then obtained by choosing a sequence
of bases of H with each basis vector converging to an eigenvector for the
minimal eigenvalue of h. QED
If the decision maker’s uncertainty aversion ν = 0, then the proposition
entails that h is the identity operator on H (the identity matrix) divided by
dimH, hence
E(P ) =
dimR(P )
dimH
P ∈ F ,
where R(P ) denotes the range of P. An uncertainty neutral (ν = 0) decision
maker is thus assigning weight to an event solely according to the dimension
of the representing projection.
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4 Examples
4.1 Ellsbergs’ paradox
As in the example by Ellsberg (1961) a decision maker is presented with an
urn containing 90 balls. He is told that 30 of the balls are red and that the
remaining 60 balls are either black or yellow, but he is given no information
about the distribution of the black and yellow balls. The decision maker
is first asked to state his preferences between three bets, each on the exact
color of a single drawn ball. The decision maker is then asked to state
his preferences between three bets in which he is given a choice between
two colors of a single drawn ball. All six bets pay out the same amounts,
conditional on the outcome of the draw.
Since the decision maker has exact information about the fraction of the
red balls, he considers a bet on the red ball to be a simple lottery described
by a probability distribution given the weight 1/3 to the event ”the ball is
red” and the weight 2/3 to the event ”the ball is not red”, and this last event
is recognized to be the same event as ”the ball is either black or yellow”.
This may be modelled by letting the event ”red ball” be represented by
the projection R and the event ”not red ball” or ”black or yellow ball” be
represented by the projection 1−R where
R =
 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 and 1−R =
 0 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 .
The decision maker is in the absence of further information not able to
subdivide the ”black or yellow ball” event into two orthogonal single color
events with a probability distribution. They are in Knight’s words ”ambigu-
ous events for which ordinary probabilities are not defined”. The two single
color events ”black ball” and ”yellow ball” belong to different ”small worlds”
and may be represented by the projections B and Y given by
B =
 0 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
 and Y =
 0 0 00 1/2 1/2
0 1/2 1/2
 .
Note that the three single color events have minorant 0, that is
R ∧B = 0, B ∧ Y = 0, R ∧ Y = 0,
and as required the majorant event B ∨ Y = 1−R. The two other majorant
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events are then easily calculated to be
R ∨B =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
 and R ∨ Y =
 1 0 00 1/2 1/2
0 1/2 1/2
 .
The three two color events B ∨ Y, R ∨ B and R ∨ Y are thus endogenously
given by the lattice operations once the one color events R, B and Y are
specified. Assume that the decision maker prefers a bet on a ”red ball” to a
bet on a ”black ball” and is indifferent between a bet on a ”black ball” and a
bet on a ”yellow ball”, that is
Bet(R) Â Bet(B) ∼ Bet(Y ).
Assume furthermore, following Ellsberg (1961) and others, that the decision
maker belongs to the group of people (appearing in numerous empirical ex-
periments) which prefer a bet on a ”black or yellow ball” to a bet on either
a ”red or yellow ball” or a bet on a ”black or red ball”, and is indifferent
between these two last bets, that is
Bet(B ∨ Y ) Â Bet(R ∨ Y ) ∼ Bet(B ∨R).
We will show that these preferences may be expressed in terms of the ex-
pected utility theory developed in the last section. The set C of consequences
is the unit interval [0, 1] and each of the six bets is an act with a two-element
preparation of projections on the Hilbert space R3 equipped with the scalar
product (this is the simplest case covered by Gleason’s theorem). The bet
on a ”red ball” is thus the act(
αR,Bet(R)
)
with preparation αR = {R, 1−R}
such that Bet(R)(R) = 1 and Bet(R)(1− R) = 0. The five other bets are in
the same way defined as acts such that the consequence is 1 in the projection
(the event) associated with the bet, and 0 in the orthogonal complement.
Preferences satisfying axioms (i) through (ix) are by Theorem 3 repre-
sented by an expected utility function U constructed from a linear functional
E on the form
E(A) = Tr(hA) A ∈ B(H),
where h is a positive semi-definite unit trace operator. We may calculate the
expected utility of the bet on a ”red ball”,
U(αR,Bet(R)) = E(R) · 1 + E(1−R) · 0 = E(R),
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and find that it equals the expected value E(R) of the event R associated
with the red ball. The same result applies, mutatis mutandis, to the five
other bets. If we choose
h =
 1/3 0 00 1/6 −1/6
0 −1/6 1/2

and calculate the expectations
E(R) =
1
3
E(B) =
1
6
E(Y ) =
1
6
E(B ∨ Y ) = 2
3
E(R ∨B) = 1
2
E(R ∨ Y ) = 1
2
we find that
E(R) > E(B) = E(Y ) and E(B ∨ Y ) > E(R ∨ Y ) = E(B ∨R).
This shows that the decision maker’s preferences may be represented by an
expected utility function also when he is unable to fit the ambiguous events
”black ball” and ”yellow ball” into the same ”small world” and assign ordinary
probabilities.
Given the weights attached to the different events, the behaviour may be
interpreted as reflecting uncertainty aversion. By Proposition 2 we find the
degree of uncertainty aversion to be:
ν = 1− λmin dimH = 1− 1
6
(2−
√
2) · 3 =
√
2
2
.
The ”non red ball” and the ”black or yellow ball” events are well defined and
identical, while the ambiguous events ”non black ball” and ”red or yellow
ball” are represented by different projections. This may seem meaningless
from the set up of the experiment, but one should remember that we are
modelling the decision maker’s perception of the given situation (as reflected
in his decisions) and not the physical properties of the system.
Note that if the decision maker is uncertainty neutral, then he assigns
weight to the various events only according to the dimension of the repre-
senting projections, and this cannot lead to a representation of the stated
preferences even with an event space description. On the other hand, we
may retain the preferences given by h but investigate other representations
of the events. But if the ambiguous ”non black ball” and ”red or yellow ball”
events are perceived by the decision maker as identical, that is 1−B = R∨Y
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then B and Y are orthogonal and thus 1 = R+B∨Y = R+B+Y. This would
correspond to the decision maker using a 3 point state space, in which case
the linear expectation functional E becomes an ordinary probability measure
on that space. However, as is well known, this description is not compatible
with the decision maker’s preferences.
4.2 Portfolio decisions
In this section we consider an example presented in Dow and Werlang (1992)
which illustrates the portfolio decisions of an agent who faces uncertainty.
The example has a single investor with wealth W > 0, a risk free asset and
a single risky asset in a one-period model. The price of the risky asset is p
and the present value of an investment in the risky asset is either H (high)
or L (low). To avoid arbitrage possibilities we assume L < p < H.
The investor may choose between going long (strategy 1) or going short
(strategy 2) in the risky asset at the given price, or he may choose to invest
his wealth in the risk free asset (strategy 3). The investor considers the
two risky investment strategies to be qualitatively different and belonging
to different ”small worlds”. In the language of the theory developed in the
previous sections we say that the two acts have different preparations.
Assume that strategy 1 is given by (α, l) with preparation α = {P, 1−P}
and strategy 2 is given by (β, s) with preparation β = {Q, 1−Q} such that
l(P ) = H − p and l(1− P ) = L− p
together with
s(Q) = −H + p and s(1−Q) = −L+ p.
Note that the investor does not question the outcomes of the two different
strategies, but only considers the known consequences to be triggered by
different events. The two preparations may be specified by setting
P =
1
3
 1 1 11 1 1
1 1 1
 and Q =
 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 .
Note that P and Q are (self-adjoint) projections on the real Hilbert space
R3 equipped with the scalar product (this is the simplest case covered by
Gleason’s theorem). Preferences satisfying axioms (i) through (ix) are by
Theorem 3 represented by an expected utility function U constructed from
a linear functional E on the form
E(A) = Tr(hA) A ∈ B(H),
17
where h is a positive semi-definite unit trace operator. If for example
h =
 1/3 −1/6 1/12−1/6 1/6 −1/6
1/12 −1/6 1/2

we find
E(P ) =
1
6
and E(Q) =
1
3
and may calculate the expected utilities
U(α, l) = E(P )(H − p) + E(1− P )(L− p) = 5
6
L+
1
6
H − p
and
U(β, s) = E(Q)(−H + p) + E(1−Q)(−L+ p) = −2
3
L− 1
3
H + p
of going either long or short in one unit of the risky asset. The investor
has a third possible strategy which is to invest in the risk free asset, and this
constant act has a utility level of 0. If the price p of the risky asset is confined
to the smaller interval (of length (H − L)/6) given by
L <
5
6
L+
1
6
H < p <
2
3
L+
1
3
H < H,
we obtain both U(α, l) < 0 and U(β, s) < 0. In this case the investor prefers
to invest in the risk free asset to going either long or short in the risky asset.
As in the Ellsberg example, these preferences may be interpreted as re-
flecting uncertainty aversion, which is modelled by choosing different prepa-
rations for the two risky investment strategies. Given the weights attached
to the different events and using Proposition 2, we find that the degree of
uncertainty aversion ν is approximately 0.8815.
5 Related literature
Since Ellsberg (1961) a substantial empirical literature has documented that
subtle differences between sources of risk or uncertainty can lead a decision
maker to treat them differently. Reflecting this, there has been a growing
theoretical literature which has focused on modelling decision making under
uncertainty, while at the same time allowing for a clear distinction between
risk and uncertainty in the spirit of Knight (1921). Karni and Schmeidler
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(1991) and more recently Wakker (2004) provide comprehensive surveys of
this literature.10 In general this literature has been focused on weakening the
Savage/Anscombe-Aumann axioms. Some authors, including in particular
Vind (2003), has chosen to abandon the Savage axioms - in the case of Vind
(2003) the totality of preferences - to construct more flexible expected utility
models.
Our paper is clearly related to this literature. In particular our approach
is related to that taken by Schmeidler (1989) in terms of the modelling of
uncertainty and uncertainty aversion. The approach taken by Schmeidler
(1989) is, in general terms, to maintain the use of a ”grand world” state
space and instead assume that decision makers assign non-additive probabil-
ities as a reflection of uncertainty aversion. It is then shown, that imposing
slightly weaker versions of the Anscombe-Aumann axioms on the preferences
it is possible to capture preferences towards uncertainty and risk aversion in
an expected utility formulation. In this framework subjective probabilities
that sum to less than one are interpreted as reflecting uncertainty aversion.
Clearly, this work demonstrates that it is possible to formulate expected util-
ity theories that capture a notion of uncertainty-aversion while still relying
on the use of a state space. A small but growing group of researchers has
begun to apply this type of framework to analyse economic situations.11
To our knowledge, there are only a few papers on decision theory that
do not rely on the explicit presence of state space. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2001) models subjective distributions without relying on a state space by
modelling preferences over acts conditional on bets. Assuming the existence
of an outcome-independent linear utility on bets subjective probabilities are
derived on the outcome that is consistent with expected value maximizing
behavior. Karni (2004) develops an axiomatic theory of decision making
under uncertainty that dispenses with the Savage state space. A subjec-
tive expected utility theory that does not invoke the notion of states of the
world to resolve uncertainty is formulated. Importantly, this approach does
not rule out that decision makers may mentally construct a state space to
help organize their thoughts - but it does not require that they do. Thus,
”traditional” theory can, as in ours, be embedded in this framework.
Chew and Sagi (2003) assumes a Savage state space, but the authors
provide a set of axioms which allow for domains of events that arise endoge-
nously according to the preferences of the decision maker (”small worlds”)
and the manner in which sources of uncertainty are treated. The authors
also show, given weak assumptions, that preferences restricted to a domain
10Early contributions include Fellner (1961) and Quiggin (1982).
11See Mukerji and Tallon (2004) for a survey of this literature.
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exhibit probabilistic sophistication. This allows for an endogenous formula-
tion of the two-stage approach and a distinction between risk and uncertainty
in a setting with a Savage state space. However, as opposed to Savage’s for-
mulation, the approach taken is to model decisions as generally taking place
at the ”small world” level, hence leaving the question of consistent extension
of decision making across distinct ”small worlds” unanswered.
Finally, our work also has links to discussions of the foundation of quan-
tum physics, in particular quantum-mechanical derivations of probability
which is closely modelled on the classical theory. See Wallace (2003a) and
Wallace (2003b) for a discussion of how decision theory may be applied in
quantum-mechanics.
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